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So far the literature has found that the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on training 
decisions is ambiguous. On the one hand, the opportunity cost to train is lower during 
downturns, and thus training should be counter-cyclical. On the other hand, a positive shock 
may be related to the adoption of new technologies and increased returns to skill, making 
training incidence pro-cyclical. Using the Canadian panel of Workplace and Employee Survey 
(WES) we find that (i) training moves counter-cyclical with the aggregate business cycle 
(more training during downturns), while at the same time (ii) the idiosyncratic sectoral shocks 
have a positive impact on training incidence (more training in sectors doing relatively better). 
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The literature has not yet resolved the issue whether investments in human capital are counter-
cyclical, pro-cyclical, or a-cyclical. Human capital will increase through training, be that im-
plicit on-the-job training (measured as tenure), or explicit classroom-type training. Our focus
in this paper is on the latter: we are interested how the incidence of human capital accumulation
through formal training depends on the business cycle.
It is not ex-ante obvious whether the dependence of training on macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
should be positive or negative. On the one hand, a negative productivity shock may be associ-
ated with increased training, since the opportunity cost to train workers is lower in downturns.
On the other hand, a positive shock may be related to the adoption of new technologies which
may require training and can provide increased returns to skill.
Both the counter-cyclical and pro-cyclical arguments have sound theoretical justiﬁcations,
yet we have little evidence which one will hold true or dominate the other empirically. The
counter-cyclical channel of lower opportunity cost is highlighted by deJong and Ingram (2001)
who ﬁnd that training activities “are distinctively countercyclical”. Arguments for the counter-
cyclicality of training can also be found in Devereux (2000) who ﬁnds evidence of labour hoard-
ing by ﬁrms: during downturns ﬁrms will assign high-skill workers to lower-production activities
such as training, avoiding some of the ﬁxed costs of ﬁring and re-hiring and ensuring longer
tenures for the skilled workers.
While Dellas and Sakellaris (2003) document that college enrollments are counter-cyclical,
King and Sweetman (2002) reach the opposite conclusion. Using administrative Canadian data
they ﬁnd that “re-tooling” is pro-cyclical, where re-tooling is measured as quits from work to
school. The outside option of higher-skill jobs goes up during episodes of high output, increasing
the value of training.
Our contribution is to provide a unifying framework where the two channels coexist. We
bring empirical evidence that training is counter-cyclical − as expected, the aggregate output
shock has a negative impact on the incidence of ﬁrm training. More importantly, we show
that the idiosyncratic sectoral shocks are pro-cyclical − ﬁrms from sectors which experience a
positive shock relative to the rest of the economy have an incentive to train more. This second
2training channel should be important empirically if for instance sectoral shocks are related to
adoption of new technologies. Then, if the idiosyncratic sectoral shocks are more persistent
that the aggregate ones, ﬁrms are more likely to invest in training following a positive sectoral
shock whose beneﬁts last longer. Moreover, the relative positive shock may attract workers
from sectors hit by negative shocks, and these workers may require remedial training in speciﬁc
skills.
To measure the eﬀect of aggregate and sectoral output ﬂuctuations on training incidence we
use the panel of the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) together with statistics
on industrial output. Our major ﬁndings are that (i) training moves counter-cyclical with the
aggregate output ﬂuctuations (more training in downturns), while at the same time (ii) the
relative position of sectoral GDP has a positive impact on training incidence (more training
in a sector doing relatively better); ﬁnally, (iii) the magnitude of these two channels is com-
parable. Depending on speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that a percentage point increase in the deviation
of aggregate output relative to its trend decreases the propensity to train between 1.5 and 2.1
percent, while a percentage point increase in the share of a sector’s output increases the propen-
sity to train between 0.6 and 1.2 percent. A speciﬁcation which accounts for heterogeneity in
the determinants of training across sectors has the sectoral channel impact even larger, at 3.2
percent, with the aggregate ﬂuctuations channel impact at -2.1 percent. When we consider the
impact of output ﬂuctuations on the proportion of workers trained by a ﬁrm, the magnitudes
are a 1.4 percent reduction in the proportion of workers trained resulting from the aggregate
shock, relative to a 1.1 percent increase from the sectoral shock.
We believe that documenting the two channels through which output ﬂuctuations inﬂuence
the training decision has very relevant theoretical and policy implications. From a theoretical
standpoint, we highlight the importance for any models of ﬁrm training to incorporate channels
stemming from both aggregate and sectoral output ﬂuctuations. Such models will help us get
a better understanding of the training decisions by ﬁrms. From a policy point of view, we
caution that observed declines in training incidence should not necessarily be interpreted as a
signal that ﬁrms underinvest in training. Instead, lower training by ﬁrms could be an optimal
response to output ﬂuctuations, be they aggregate or sectoral.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the microdata used in the analysis and
3references the sources of data for sectoral and aggregate output. Section 3 discusses our main




We use the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (WES), which is a nationally represen-
tative matched employer-employee survey with a longitudinal design from 1999 to 2005. The
sample of locations in the frame is stratiﬁed by industry, region and size, and survey weights
are used throughout the analysis. We only use the ﬁrm side of the WES, as it is diﬃcult to
infer ﬁrm-speciﬁc distributions from the worker side − only very few workers (sometimes as
little as two) are interviewed per establishment.
Training is deﬁned as an indicator of classroom (formal) training (CT) oﬀered by ﬁrms, who
are asked in the survey whether they had oﬀered any training to their workers. We perform
sensitivity analysis to two other deﬁnitions of training: (i) the percentage of the workforce
trained by each ﬁrm, and (ii) a training indicator when on-the-job training (OJT) is added to
classroom training.2 Means of the training variables are in the top panel of Table 1. To control
for observed ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants of training, we follow the literature (e.g. Turcotte and
Montmarquette (2003)) by using the variables listed in the bottom panel of Table 1.
2.2 Output ﬂuctuation series
To capture the aggregate business cycle eﬀects we use the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
series from Statistics Canada. Series for the overall economy, as well as by sectors, are available
since early 1980s and are reported in 2000 constant dollars. Since the time period surveyed by
the WES is between April 1st of the previous year and March 31st of the current year we use
quarterly GDP aggregated into annual series to correspond to the timing in WES.
2Note that on-the-job training may not be a good measure of training in this context. First of all, it is
measured with a lot of noise since it comes from the worker side of the survey and thus it is not a representative
measure for the ﬁrm. Moreover, while on-the-job training can be an important human capital accumulation
channel, experience gets accumulated implicitly and it is not necessarily an explicit investment decision by the
ﬁrm (aside from tenure-related policies). This aggregate measure of training is only of secondary relevance to
our analysis.
4The classiﬁcation of sectors in the WES follows for most part the two-digit North American
Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) with a few small diﬀerences: in the WES, some indus-
tries from the NAICS are aggregated into a single group; and ﬁrms from the agricultural sector
are not sampled in the WES. Since we use the sectors as deﬁned in the WES, we aggregate the
sectors from the output ﬂuctuation statistics in a manner consistent with the WES. The list
of sectors used in the analysis together with their relative shares is presented in Table 2. We
detrend the real GDP series using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. Figure 1 presents the GDP series
and the HP-ﬁltered GDP and trend respectively. In estimation we use either the detrended
GDP series (in billions) or, for easier interpretation of the regression coeﬃcients, the ratio of
detrended GDP to the HP trend (the latter is unit-of-measure free).
For the relative position of each sector we use the share of that sector’s output in total
output, using the same series as when constructing the aggregate GDP. For reason of space, we
omit from here graphs with the relative sectoral position and training incidence by respective
sectors.
3 Evidence on macroeconomic ﬂuctuations and training
3.1 Model speciﬁcation
In our main speciﬁcation we use a binary response model to measure the impact of business
cycles on the propensity of a workplace to oﬀer training. Let Dit be a binary training indicator
taking the value 1 if ﬁrm i from sector j provided training in period t, and 0 otherwise. We
estimate the probability of ﬁrm i to train its workers in period t, Pit, conditional on the
information set Ωijt: Pit = Pr(Dit = 1|ωijt) = E[Dit|ωijt], where ωijt is a collection of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics Xit (as mentioned in Table 1) and sector- or economy-wide characteristics
Zjt. The conditional expectation is modeled using the following speciﬁcation: E[Dit|ωijt] =
Λ(ωγ) = Λ(αi + βXit + δZjt + uit) where Λ is the probability link function, logistic in our
implementation, and γ the set of coeﬃcients.
The results come from conditional ﬁxed eﬀects logistic regressions3 using panel weights
provided by WES and clustering by sectors. The Hausman test rejected ﬁrm-speciﬁc random
3Except for when the left-hand side variable is continuous (fraction of workforce trained) when we implement
panel OLS and tobit to account for the mass of ﬁrms with zero training.
5eﬀects in favour of the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation.
The economy-wide factors are the deviations of GDP from the HP trend (in billions) and
the share of each sector in total output. All results reported here also include the HP-ﬁltered
trend as a regressor. Sensitivity analysis (available form the authors) indicates that including
or not the trend does not change the other coeﬃcients much, and does not change the story at
all. We report estimation coeﬃcients in all results. For the logit case, to obtain marginal eﬀects
the coeﬃcients have to be scaled by a factor of Λ′ = Λ(ωγ)(1 − Λ(ωγ) with the logistic cdf
Λ(x) = ex
1+ex. The factor of proportionality Λ(1−Λ), computed as average over all observations,
is around .25 in all speciﬁcations. We report the factor of proportionality in the footnotes of
each respective results table. To make the results easier to interpret, we report coeﬃcients
for the aggregate ﬂuctuation measured as ratio of detrended GDP to the HP trend, since it is
unit-of-measure free. In the footnotes of each table we also report the coeﬃcients for the real
detrended GDP measured in billion Canadian dollars (base 2000).
3.2 The impact of output ﬂuctuations on training incidence
We start by presenting the main results in Table 3. The coeﬃcient on aggregate output ﬂuctua-
tions is negative and signiﬁcant, implying that training is counter-cyclical. In other words, ﬁrms
are more likely to provide their workers with training during downturns. This is in line with the
argument that workers are relatively less productive during downturns, hence the opportunity
cost of training (foregone output) is relatively smaller during recessions. The magnitude of the
coeﬃcient implies that a percentage point change in the ratio of GDP ﬂuctuations to the HP
trend will decrease the probability that a ﬁrm trains by 1.5 percent.4
The coeﬃcient on the relative sectoral output variable is positive. This tells us that ﬁrms
are also more likely to train if the sectors they operate in are hit by relatively more favorable
shocks. This second channel is related to the fact that sectors doing relatively better will attract
workers from sectors doing relatively worse, and these workers will need remedial skill training
in the new sector. The other explanation, that ﬁrms in sectors who do relatively better (even in
a downturn) may adopt new technologies which require a better trained workforce, while still
present, is also captured to some extent by other ﬁrm-speciﬁc controls such as “innovation”.
4The marginal eﬀect is the coeﬃcient -0.061 times the logistic factor of proportionality .244.
6The marginal eﬀect of the relative sectoral channel is slightly smaller than the one of the
aggregate ﬂuctuations, but of a comparable order of magnitude: a percentage point increase in
the relative sector position will decrease the probability that a ﬁrm trains by 1.2 percent.5
For the remainder of this section we present some evidence that our quantiﬁcation of the two
output ﬂuctuation channels determining training incidence is robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations
and deﬁnitions of training.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
3.3.1 Firm-speciﬁc determinants of training incidence
In terms of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors that inﬂuence training, we ﬁnd from Table 3 that on
average high training ﬁrms are characterized on the average as being more innovative, more
diversiﬁed and larger, more likely to be not unionized, and less likely to employ sales and
technical personnel. This is in line with what has been documented elsewhere in the literature
of ﬁrm training determinants − see for instance Lynch and Black (1998) for the U.S., Dearden,
Reed, and Reenen (2006) for the U.K., and Turcotte and Montmarquette (2003) for Canada.
Note that in all speciﬁcations we control for a ﬁrm-reported measure of innovation and
adoption of new technologies. Moreover, Table 4 reports the correlations between the skill
distribution of the workforce and the idiosyncratic sectoral shock. There is a negative correlation
between the sectoral shock and the fraction of unskilled “production” workers, while all other
correlations are positive. We interpret this as suggestive evidence that the idiosyncratic sectoral
shock channel induces reallocation of lower-skill workers from the sectors doing relatively poorly
to the sectors doing relatively better.
A speciﬁcation accounting for heterogeneity in the determinants of training has found that
these variables can have diﬀerent impacts depending on the sector they apply to. The detailed
coeﬃcients form the analysis with heterogeneous determinants of training by sectors can be
found in Appendix Appendix A. The diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant, indicating the
need for caution when considering models of ﬁrm training. For instance, ﬁrms in manufacturing
have the opposite training determinants in terms of the skill of their workforce (measured as
percentage from diﬀerent skill categories). This is a relevant ﬁnding given that a lot of studies
5The marginal eﬀect is the coeﬃcient 0.026 times the logistic factor of proportionality .244.
7focus exclusively on the manufacturing sector. At least for the Canadian context, results for
manufacturing ﬁrms only can give opposite conclusions from the average.
A notable ﬁnding from the heterogeneity analysis is that the sectoral ﬂuctuations channel
shows a larger magnitude − compared to the other speciﬁcations, and compared to the aggre-
gate ﬂuctuations channel (.134 logit coeﬃcient, which translates into a sizeable .0348 marginal
eﬀect).
3.3.2 Marginal beneﬁts of past training and training incidence
In their training decisions, ﬁrms may take into account productivity improvements coming
from previous episodes of training. If a ﬁrm had experienced positive training impacts, it may
be more likely to engage in training again. Kayahan (2007) documents a correlation between
past returns to training for the ﬁrm and training incidence. We extend these ﬁndings here by
exploiting the variation across sectors and time to explicitly formalize a relationship between
past beneﬁts of training for the ﬁrm and current training incidence.6
In Table 5 we present sensitivity results for the speciﬁcation where the marginal beneﬁt of
past training is included as a determinant of training. Our story and our results do not change
when adding lagged marginal beneﬁts of training. If anything, the eﬀect of output ﬂuctuations
on training propensity are larger, -2.1 percent for the aggregate ﬂuctuations relative to trend,
and 1.2 percent for the relative sectoral position, while the gap between the two channels (in
absolute value) has shrunk. As for the impact of previous marginal beneﬁts of training, they
are positive and signiﬁcant.7
6Measuring the returns to training for the ﬁrm is a non-trivial task. Most of the literature has focused on
estimating returns to training on the worker side, and because of lack of appropriate ﬁrm-level data not much
work has been done on estimating the impact of training on productivity. We are only aware of three studies
which have investigated the impact of training on ﬁrm productivity by estimating a ﬁrm-level production
function: Dearden, Reed, and Reenen (2006) for the U.K., Almeida and Carneiro (2005) for Portugal, and
Kayahan (2007) for Canada. All these papers exploit the longitudinal nature of ﬁrm-level data (Almeida and
Carneiro (2005) and Kayahan (2007)) or aggregate industry data (Dearden, Reed, and Reenen (2006)) to
estimate production functions that exploit heterogeneity at the ﬁrm or industry level, accounting for training
as an input in the accumulation of human capital. The econometric methodology, GMM Instrumental Variable
estimator using lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences of variables as instruments in the level equations (Blundell and Bond
(1998)), addresses both the issue of training endogeneity and unobserved ﬁrm characteristics.
7In other speciﬁcations, such as the one in Table 6, the beneﬁts from the ﬁrst pre-training lag can be insignif-
icant but negative, while the second lag beneﬁts are always signiﬁcant and positive. This can be attributed to
some persistent eﬀect of training, which could make it unnecessary for ﬁrms to train every single period.
83.3.3 Deﬁnition of training: percentage of workforce trained
For this sensitivity check we change the dependent variable from a dychotomous indicator of
training propensity to a continuous indicator where the left-hand side variable is the percentage
of workforce trained. These results are in Table 6, and indicate the same story as the one from
the propensity to train model.A percentage point increase in the deviation of (detrended) output
from HP trend decreases the percentage of workforce trained by 1.4 percent, while a percentage
point increase in the share of a sector in total output increases the percentage of workforce
trained by 1.1 percent.
3.3.4 Deﬁnition of training: adding on-the-job training to classroom training
Here we conduct the same analysis as we have done in the previous section, only this time the
dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether the ﬁrm has provided any training
at all: on-the-job implicit training is added to formal classroom training. While we have
our reservations about this measure (it comes from the matched worker side of the survey,
where only a handful of workers are interviewed for each ﬁrm), this is a more general measure
of training which includes both types of training (formal and/or informal). We have other
reservations as well, because conceptually on-the-job training measures a very diﬀerent type of
human capital acquisition than classroom training. The results from this analysis are presented
in Table 7. While the signs of the relevant coeﬃcients are the same as before, in this analysis
the aggregate output shock eﬀect is no longer signiﬁcant (while the sectoral eﬀect is). We
believe this has a lot to do with the noise in constructing this training measure.
4 Conclusion
The sectoral analysis is very important in specifying the links between the aggregate business
cycle, sectoral idiosyncratic shocks, ﬁrm innovation, and the incidence and intensity of training.
We ﬁnd training to be counter-cyclical − ﬁrms train more in downturns, while sectoral shocks
have a positive impact on training incidence − more training when the sector has a relatively
better position. The magnitudes of these adjustments are of similar order, with the relative
sectoral channel having either a slightly smaller impact or a slightly larger impact than the
aggregate ﬂuctuations one, depending on speciﬁcation.
9We believe the ﬁnding of two opposing channels through which output ﬂuctuations aﬀect
training decisions has large relevance for at least three reasons: (i) ﬁrst, it gives us better
insight in understanding ﬁrms’ training decisions over the business cycle (ii) second, it gives
us a glimpse into how the persistence of aggregate relative to sectoral shocks plays into the
human capital accumulation channel, and (iii) ﬁnally, it helps policy-makers understand that
ﬂuctuations in training incidence may be optimal responses to macroeconomic shocks, and not
necessarily indicators of underinvestment in training.
In terms of a model, a simple illustration makes our point. Consider the basic Mortensen-
Pissarides search and matching model, where the productive match is subject to a productivity
shock y = pǫ, with p the aggregate shock and ǫ the idiosyncratic sectoral one. Let α be a match-
speciﬁc productivity. Training is available for meetings above some productivity threshold,
below which no matches are formed, with our without training. In equilibrium only matches
above the productivity threshold but below some cut-oﬀ realized productivity are trained. Firms
train as long as the beneﬁt from training is higher than the cost. When an aggregate negative
shock p hits all sectors, training will increase as long as the marginal cost of training is higher
than the marginal beneﬁt with respect to p, which is easy to achieve under very reasonable
parametrizations. When an idiosyncratic shock ǫ hits sectors there will be worker reallocation
from the low to the high productivity sectors. This decreases the average match quality α in
the sectors not hit by negative shocks and increases worker congestion, to the extent that more
matches will fall within the training productivity interval; thus, more training will take place
in the relatively better sectors. A sketch of this model is presented in Appendix B.
In terms of policy, there is scope for government intervention in training as long as policy-
makers worry that ﬁrms under-invest in training. In deciding how much training to provide,
ﬁrms will take into consideration how likely the workers are to stay with the ﬁrm once the
training is completed. If private returns to training are large but ﬁrms do not train for fear of
losing workers to higher-paying jobs, then it is socially optimal to provide government training,
or to provide workers/ﬁrms with incentives to increase training.8 Documented aggregate and
8As for the eﬀectiveness of ﬁrm versus government training, contrary to what has been the status-quo in the
literature, recent work by Kambourov, Manovskii, and Plesca (2009) has shown that the impact of government
training programs is more positive than previously thought. Once post-training occupation mobility behaviour
is accounted for, wage returns from government-sponsored training are comparable to those from employer-
sponsored training, making the case for a possible role for government intervention in training.
10sectoral output ﬂuctuations can inform policy whether observed trends in training are healthy,
as dictated by economic circumstances, or whether ﬁrms under-invest in training and therefore
direct government intervention should be recommended.
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1213Table 1: Statistics for Training and for Firm Speciﬁc Variables
Variable Description Mean Std Dev
Classroom Training Indicator 0.340 0.474
% Workforce Trained 0.213 0.446
Classroom Training plus OJT Indicator 0.577 0.494
Firm size Number of workers employed by the workplace 16.7 49.7
Innovation Adoption of innovation and/or new technology by the workplace 0.489 0.499
Unionized Indicator whether the workplace is unionized 0.057 0.232
Multiple loc. Indicator whether the workplace belongs to a multiple-location ﬁrm 0.455 0.498












14Table 2: Sectors in the Analysis
Sector Relative Size (%)
Forestry and Mining 5 %
Construction 13 %
Transportation, Warehouse, Wholesale Trade 13 %
Information, Communication and Utilities 10 %
Finance and Insurance 7 %
Real Estate 6 %
Business Services 10 %
Education and Health 4 %
Manufacturing 21 %
Retail Trade and Consumer Services 11 %
Number of ﬁrms 5535
Table 3: The Impact of Aggregate and Sectoral
Output Fluctuations on Training Incidence
Variables Coeﬃcientsa Std. Err
GDP ﬂuctuations b -0.061 0.0023
Sector to GDP ratio 0.026 0.002
Innovation 0.604 0.005
Market: Canada c 0.080 0.010
Market: World 0.457 0.019
ln (Firm size) 0.536 0.008
Multiple locations 0.094 0.006
Unionized -0.118 0.017
% Administrative d 0.552 0.020
% Managerial 0.535 0.020
% Other 1.127 0.020
% Sales 0.268 0.020
% Production 0.630 0.019
% Technical 0.112 0.018
GDP trend 0.001 0.00004
a Factor of proportionality for marginal eﬀects
Λ(1 − Λ) = .244
b Coeﬃcient for detrended GDP relative to HP
trend. For the GDP expressed in real billions
the coeﬃcient is -0.007 (0.0002).
c Base category: Local market
d Base category: Professional
15Table 4: Correlations Between Sectoral
Relative Position and Workforce Skill
Distribution








Correlations signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Table 5: The Impact of Aggregate and Sec-
toral Output Fluctuations on Training Incidence:
Controlling for Previous Training Beneﬁts
Variables Coeﬃcients Std. Err
GDP ﬂuctuations -0.085 0.005
Sector to GDP ratio 0.050 0.004
Innovation 0.721 0.008
Market: Canada a 0.361 0.014
Market: World 0.502 0.028
ln (Firm size) 0.602 0.013
Multiple locations -0.100 0.025
Unionized 1.669 0.034
% Administrative b 1.395 0.030
% Managerial 1.616 0.032
% Other 0.820 0.030
% Sales 1.521 0.028
% Production 0.914 0.025
% Technical 0.002 0.0001
GDP trend 0.002 0.0001
MBt−1 0.104 0.029
MBt−2 0.277 0.026
a Factor of proportionality for marginal eﬀects
Λ(1 − Λ) = .246
b Coeﬃcient for detrended GDP relative to HP
trend. For the GDP expressed in real billions
the coeﬃcient is -0.009 (0.001).
c Base category: Local market
d Base category: Professional
16Table 6: The Impact of Aggregate and Sectoral
Output Fluctuations on Training Intensity: %
Workforce Trained)
Variables Coeﬃcients a Std. Err
GDP ﬂuctuations b -0.014 0.007
Sector to GDP ratio 0.011 0.006
Innovation 0.074 0.011
Market: Canada c 0.027 0.023
Market: World 0.068 0.042
ln (Firm size) -0.044 0.020
Unionized -0.078 0.039
% Administrative d 0.121 0.048
% Managerial 0.117 0.045
% Other 0.193 0.048
% Sales 0.092 0.045
% Production 0.186 0.044
% Technical 0.082 0.042
GDP trend 0.00003 0.0002
MBt−1 -0.021 0.034
MBt−2 0.011 0.034
a Coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects
b Coeﬃcient for detrended GDP relative to HP
trend. For the GDP expressed in real billions
the coeﬃcient is -0.001 (0.001).
c Base category: Local market
d Base category: Professional
17Table 7: The Impact of Aggregate and Sec-
toral Output Fluctuations on Training Incidence:
Adding OJT to CT in the Deﬁnition of Training
Variables Coeﬃcients a Std. Err
GDP ﬂuctuations b 0.003 0.002
Sector to GDP ratio 0.060 0.002
Innovation 0.492 0.005
Market: Canada c 0.327 0.010
Market: World -0.358 0.016
ln (Firm size) 0.351 0.008
Multiple locations -0.084 0.006
Unionized -0.307 0.016
% Administrative d 0.210 0.018
% Managerial 0.049 0.018
% Other -0.038 0.018
% Sales 0.463 0.018
% Production 0.338 0.017
% Technical -0.050 0.017
GDP trend 0.00009 0.00004
a Factor of proportionality for marginal eﬀects
Λ(1 − Λ) = .246
b Coeﬃcient for detrended GDP relative to HP
trend. For the GDP in real billions the coeﬃ-
cient is 0.000 (0.0002).
c Base category: Local market
d Base category: Professional
18Appendix A Heterogeneity in training determinants
Table A1: Sectoral Heterogeneity in Firm-Speciﬁc Determinants of Training
Variable Coef. Std.Er. Variable Coef. Std.Er
GDP ﬂuctuations -0.090 0.002
Sector to GDP ratio 0.134 0.006
Innovation 0.218 0.018 Administrative -0.855 0.092
Innovation* Sector 1 -0.252 0.044 Administrative* Sector 1 -0.250 0.179
Innovation* Sector 2 0.407 0.025 Administrative* Sector 2 2.141 0.128
Innovation* Sector 3 -0.066 0.023 Administrative* Sector 3 1.316 0.103
Innovation* Sector 4 0.524 0.039 Administrative* Sector 4 1.604 0.141
Innovation* Sector 5 0.673 0.026 Administrative* Sector 5 0.330 0.107
Innovation* Sector 6 -0.496 0.049 Administrative* Sector 6 3.487 0.167
Innovation* Sector 7 0.972 0.023 Administrative* Sector 7 1.055 0.099
Innovation* Sector 8 0.293 0.024 Administrative* Sector 8 1.607 0.099
Innovation* Sector 10 0.431 0.021 Administrative* Sector 10 3.388 0.110
Market Canada 0.248 0.025 Sales -3.492 0.113
Market Canada* Sector 1 -1.677 0.071 Sales* Sector 1 1.570 0.306
Market Canada* Sector 2 -0.279 0.044 Sales* Sector 2 8.691 0.171
Market Canada* Sector 3 -1.193 0.032 Sales* Sector 3 5.166 0.118
Market Canada* Sector 4 0.057 0.071 Sales* Sector 4 3.921 0.173
Market Canada* Sector 5 0.689 0.047 Sales* Sector 5 2.363 0.124
Market Canada* Sector 6 -0.375 0.069 Sales* Sector 6 7.040 0.207
Market Canada* Sector 7 0.755 0.041 Sales* Sector 7 4.179 0.122
Market Canada* Sector 8 1.343 0.061 Sales* Sector 8 14.370 0.495
Market Canada* Sector 10 -0.016 0.041 Sales* Sector 10 4.238 0.123
Market World 0.057 0.034 Managerial -2.093 0.095
Market World* Sector 1 0.227 0.106 Managerial* Sector 1 4.637 0.161
Market World* Sector 2 -12.084 660.719 Managerial* Sector 2 5.071 0.115
Market World* Sector 3 -0.870 0.063 Managerial* Sector 3 2.734 0.104
Market World* Sector 4 -0.127 0.074 Managerial* Sector 4 1.809 0.135
Market World* Sector 5 1.620 0.102 Managerial* Sector 5 1.324 0.109
Market World* Sector 6 1.061 0.260 Managerial* Sector 6 7.045 0.197
Market World* Sector 7 1.899 0.054 Managerial* Sector 7 2.802 0.103
Market World* Sector 10 0.046 0.130 Managerial* Sector 8 4.202 0.109
ln (Firm size) 1.189 0.020 Managerial* Sector 10 1.554 0.107
ln (Firm size)* Sector 1 0.096 0.043 Technical -1.981 0.076
ln (Firm size)* Sector 2 -0.347 0.027 Technical* Sector 1 3.886 0.133
ln (Firm size)* Sector 3 -0.561 0.023 Technical* Sector 2 4.268 0.095
ln (Firm size)* Sector 4 -0.561 0.034 Technical* Sector 3 1.993 0.087
ln (Firm size)* Sector 5 -1.105 0.033 Technical* Sector 4 0.994 0.134
ln (Firm size)* Sector 6 -1.782 0.048 Technical* Sector 5 1.964 0.095
ln (Firm size)* Sector 7 -0.741 0.024 Technical* Sector 6 7.975 0.269
ln (Firm size)* Sector 8 -0.972 0.030 Technical* Sector 7 2.960 0.085
ln (Firm size)* Sector 10 -0.733 0.025 Technical* Sector 8 2.425 0.083
Multiple locations 0.060 0.018 Technical* Sector 10 0.088 0.095
Multiple locations* Sector 1 -1.503 0.049 Production -1.794 0.075
Multiple locations* Sector 2 0.017 0.029 Production* Sector 1 2.748 0.137
Multiple locations* Sector 3 0.288 0.023 Production* Sector 2 4.589 0.101
Multiple locations* Sector 4 0.715 0.036 Production* Sector 3 1.885 0.084
Multiple locations* Sector 5 0.666 0.026 Production* Sector 4 0.211 0.138
Multiple locations* Sector 6 0.270 0.050 Production* Sector 5 1.727 0.098
Multiple locations* Sector 7 -0.188 0.023 Production* Sector 6 5.929 0.183
Multiple locations* Sector 8 -0.270 0.023 Production* Sector 7 -2.272 0.100
Multiple locations* Sector 10 -0.196 0.021 Production* Sector 8 3.625 0.095
Unionized 0.588 0.053 Production* Sector 10 4.684 0.092
Unionized* Sector 1 -0.777 0.121 Other -1.181 0.099
Unionized* Sector 2 -1.529 0.068 Other* Sector 1 3.098 0.188
Unionized* Sector 3 -0.679 0.071 Other* Sector 2 3.602 0.133
Unionized* Sector 4 -0.339 0.084 Other* Sector 3 2.735 0.109
Unionized* Sector 5 0.685 0.074 Other* Sector 4 0.533 0.155
Unionized* Sector 6 -3.684 0.227 Other* Sector 5 -0.650 0.122
Unionized* Sector 7 -0.297 0.074 Other* Sector 6 4.957 0.191
Unionized* Sector 8 -0.688 0.181 Other* Sector 7 0.458 0.113
Unionized* Sector 10 -2.097 0.071 Other* Sector 8 3.110 0.112
GDP trend 0.001 0.000 Other* Sector 10 4.269 0.112
19Appendix B Sketch of Mortensen-Pissarides model with
training
The model presented here is a very stylized textbook model of training and productivity based
on Pissarides (2000), which serves to illustrate the relationship between aggregate and sectoral
speciﬁc shocks and training by ﬁrms.
Firms open vacancies whenever they want to ﬁll a job. Keeping a vacancy open implies
a cost c. The rate at which unemployed workers and open vacancies meet, in each sector is
regulated by meeting functions m(vi,u) that depends on the number of unemployed workers and
vacancies created in the particular sector i. Once there is a meeting ﬁrms observe the worker
speciﬁc productivity α and decide if the candidate is suitable for the job. A productive match
is formed if α is above the reservation value Ri. Upon creating a match the ﬁrm evaluates the
opportunity to train the worker. Depending on the productivity of the worker and whether the
worker has been trained or not a wage wk(α) is paid, with k = u,τ for untrained and trained
respectively. Training, as well as the productivity α, are speciﬁc to the match: if the match
is dissolved the worker returns to the pool of unemployed workers with unknown productivity,
and with the same expected productivity she had before the match (and same as everybody
else in that pool). After a match is created shocks can arrive at a rate λ which will dissolve
the match and let the worker be unemployed again. Wages are set by Nash bargaining.
Following Pissarides (2000) the meeting function is written as m(vi,u) = m(1, u
vi)vi ≡
q(θi)vi, where θi =
vi
u is market tightness in sector i. Given the meeting function the ratio at




Ri dF(α), where b is the upper limit of
the shock distribution and r is the reservation value. The ratio at which unemployed workers




Appendix B.1 Value of a match to an employer
The value of a job to an employer depends on the productivity speciﬁc to that match and
the level of training given to the worker. We assume that the level of training is decided at
the starting of a match (empirical evidence from the NLSY suggests that training takes place
very early in the employer tenure), and that the cost of training is paid by the employer every
period the worker is employed (such an insurance-type cost scheme enables ﬁrm training even
20if training is in transferable general skills). Output is the product of the shock α and the
productivity parameter yi = pǫi, where p is an aggregate productivity shock and ǫi a sector-
speciﬁc idiosyncratic one.
The value of a match to an employer who trains Ju
i (α) − or not Ju
i (α) − is given by:
rJ
u
i (α) = yiα − w
u





i (α) = yih(α) − w
τ
i (α) − C(yα) − λJ
τ
i (α). (2)
Here h(α) is a function that describes how productivity increases with training and it is assumed
to be increasing in α, C(yα) is the cost of training, and wτ and wu the wage rates oﬀered to
the trained and respectively untrained workers.9
The asset equations above describe the value of a match. Training is required for workers
with productivity levels above the reservation threshold Ri but below ατ,i, while is not required
for workers with higher productivity. Given a unique training reservation productivity, the














where the superscript e indicates the expectation conditional on α being greater than the
productivity threshold Ri.
Appendix B.2 Value of a match to a worker
The value of a match to a worker is determined by the following asset equations:
rW
u
i (α) = w
u





i (α) = w
τ
i (α) + λ[U − W
τ
i (α)]. (5)














9Note that if we were interested in say the optimal amount of training T oﬀered, we could introduce it via
the beneﬁt and cost of training h(α,T) and C(T,yα) where T can denote the amount of training, h(α,T) is
concave in T and C(T,yα) is convex in T. Here we focus on training incidence instead.
21Appendix B.3 Value of a vacancy and of unemployment
The value of setting a vacancy to an employer is
rVi = −c + q
f
i [Je − V ].
In equilibrium free entry sets the value of a vacancy to zero.
The value of unemployment to a worker depends on the number and the conditions of all
sectors in the economy, since each unemployed worker can be matched stochastically with any
of the ﬁrms opening vacancies in each sector. For simplicity, we assume that there are only
two sectors in the economy indexed by i = 1,2. In this case we have that the total number
of vacancies formed in the economy is given by v = v1 + v2 and the overall tightness of the
economy is described by θ = θ1 + θ2. The value of unemployment is then
rU = z + qw
1 [W e
1 − U] + qw
2 [W e
2 − U],
where z represents unemployment contingent income.
Appendix B.4 Wages and Training
Assuming that the wage rates are set following the Nash bargaining rule, after some algebra
we can derive the wage rate for trained and untrained workers,
w
τ
i (α) = β[yih(α) − C(yiα)] + (1 − β)z + βcθ (7)
w
u
i (α) = βyiα + (1 − β)z + βcθ. (8)
Reservation value for training
Training occurs as long as Jτ(α) ≥ 0 and up to the point where the value of an untrained
match is equal to the value of a trained match, that is, Ju(ατ) = Jτ(ατ), or:
yi[ατ,i − h(ατ,i)] = w
u
i (ατ,i) − w
τ
i (ατ,i) − C(yiατ,i)
yi[h(ατ,i) − ατ,i] = C(yiατ,i) (9)
Reservation value for hiring
The reservation value for hiring is set by the following equation max{Ju(R),Jτ(R)} = 0. Notice
that, as long as R < ατ (and therefore some training occurs), the relevant condition can be
re-written as Jτ(R) = 0, or (1 − β)[yh(R) − C(yR)] = (1 − β)z + βcθ.




22Appendix B.5 Aggregate Shocks
Assume that sectors 1 and 2 are identical (because the assumption that sectors are identical
we drop the subscript “i”), and focus on how the aggregate productivity shock p inﬂuences the
decision to train. When p changes the two reservation productivity thresholds ατ (for training
decisions) and R (for hiring decisions) may also change.
From equation (9) we can see that if and how ατ changes depends on what we assume about
the functions h and C. We can therefore ﬁnd appropriate functions that deliver the predictions
we observe from the data. In particular, if we assume that




when overall productivity decreases, training gets more convenient because its cost decreases
faster than the relative beneﬁt and ατ raises.
When y decreases θ should decrease as well since unemployment increases for the whole
economy more than vacancies do. Therefore, the RHS of (10) decreases and the so LHS has to
decrease as well. If, like in the basic Pissarided model with stochastic job matching, R should
also increase, then the higher R in this case might imply lower training because relatively more
workers with higher productivity and no need for training are going to be hired. (Note there
is no such problem if R does not increase, or if at the same time ατ raises suﬃciently). The
ﬁnal eﬀect would depend on the parametrization of the model and the choice of h and C, and
as such, we can always ﬁnd reasonable functions for which the ﬁrst channel on ατ prevails and
generates counter-cyclical training.
Appendix B.6 Sectoral reallocation
The impact of the idiosyncratic shock ǫi is easier to show when we think of the adjustments
that happen when one sector only, say for instance sector 2, experiences a negative shock, that
is, ǫ2 is lower. Re-proposing equation (10) for sector 1 we have,




The new steady state implies a higher unemployment and lower θ, adjustments through which
sector 2 inﬂuences sector 1. In equation (12) the RHS is lower, and, because y1 does not go
23down, the only way to re-establish the equality is by reducing R. (Also note that with no change
in ǫ1, ατ,1 does not change, as θ does not enter in its determination.) Therefore, because the
pool of workers to be trained is now larger, training will increase in sector 1.
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